Question 1. Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

62. Next in order I ask about enjoying in itself, and first - on the supposition that it is something precisely of the will - I ask whether it is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will, to wit delight.

That it is delight my proof is:

Because the fruit is the final thing expected from a tree, and enjoying is said of fruit; but the ultimate fruit is not the eating itself but the delight is, because of which fruit is eaten and for which fruit is sought. Things are similar, then, in spiritual matters, namely that fruit is the final thing expected from the object; but delight is of this sort; because delight also follows the act, Ethics 10.4.1174b31-33,     therefore it is the final thing; therefore etc     .

63. Again, Galatians 5.22: “The fruits of the Spirit are peace, joy,     etc .” All these things are passions - and especially joy, which is delight - or they are at least not acts but things consequent to act; but fruit is what we per se enjoy; therefore      enjoying is Interpolation: “Thirdly, Augustine On the Trinity X ch.10 n.13: ‘We enjoy things known, in which the very will in itself rests delighted’. So delight either is the same as enjoyment, and the proposition is gained, or it is something consequent and posterior (as a certain property), and thus the definition given of enjoying [n.62] is not appropriate, because the posterior is not put in the definition of the prior nor a property in the definition of the subject” [n.72]. ¹⁷ something per se consequent to act, as it seems.

64. On the contrary:

The will loves God by an elicited act; either then it loves God for the sake of something else, and then it is using him and so is perverse, or it loves him for himself, and then it is enjoying him (from the definition of ‘enjoying’ [n.62]), and so enjoying is an act.

I. To the Question

65. In this question one must look first into the concepts themselves and second into the thing signified by the name.

66. As to the first I say that just as there are in the intellect two acts of assenting to some proposition - one by which it assents to something true on its own account, as to a principle, another by which it assents to some true proposition, not on its own account, but on account of something else true, as it assents to a conclusion - so there are in the will two acts of assenting to the good, one by which it assents to some good on its own account, another by which it assents to some good on account of something else to which it refers that good, just as the conclusion is assented to because of the principle, since the conclusion has its truth from the principle. This likeness can be got from the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139a21-22, where it is said that “in the mind there is affirmation and negation, but this in the appetite is pursuit and flight;” and so, further, just as in the mind there is a double affirmation, on its own account and on account of another, so there is in the appetite a double prosecution or adhering, on its own account and on account of another.

67. There is between these, however, a double difference. First, because the two assents of the intellect are distinguished by the nature of their objects; for they are different according to the different evidence of this and of that, and therefore they have distinct objects corresponding to them and causing them. But in the case of the will the assents are not from distinction of objects but from a distinct act of a free faculty accepting its object in this way or in that, because, as was said above [n.16], it is in its power to act in this way or in that, referring or not referring it [sc. to another]; and so there are no distinct proper objects corresponding to those acts, but any ‘will’-able good at all is had by the will for object according to this act or according to that.

The second difference is that the two assents of the intellect constitute a sufficient division of assent in general, nor is there any middle in between, because there is on the part of the object no evidence in between from which some other truth might be received than the truth of a principle or of a conclusion. But there is in addition to the two assents of the will some assent in between, because there can be shown to the will some good that is apprehended absolutely, not under the idea of something good for its own sake or good for the sake of something else. Now the will can have an act in respect of such a good thus shown, and not necessarily a disordered act; therefore it can have an act of willing that good absolutely, without any relation to anything else, or without any enjoyment of it for its own sake; and further, the will can command the intellect to inquire into what sort the good is and how it should be willed, and then it can in this way assent to it, - and the whole nature of the difference on this side and on that is freedom of the will and natural necessity on the part of the intellect.

68. From this one may say further: an act of an assent to a good for its own sake is a perfect act; but on a perfect act delight follows, from Ethics 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore on an act of willing a good for its own sake some delight follows.

We have then in respect of the proposed intention four distinct things: an imperfect act of willing a good for the sake of something else, which is called use, and a perfect act of willing the good for its own sake, which is called enjoyment, and a neutral act, and a delight consequent to the act.

69. On the second principal point [n.65], namely to which of them the name ‘enjoying’ belongs, the answer can be collected from the authorities that speak about the word ‘enjoying’ [from Augustine nn.70-72]; it is plain that it is not the neutral act, nor is the act of use the act of enjoying, but the dispute concerns only the perfect act and the delight that follows it.

I reply: some authorities seem to say that enjoying is the perfect act alone, some that it is the delight alone; some that it includes both, and then it does not signify any being that is per se one, but one by aggregation from two beings, or a being per accidens: nor is it discordant that one name should signify many things, because the Iliad, according to the Philosopher at Metaphysics 7.4.1030a6-10, is able to signify the whole Trojan War.

70. That it is the act alone is seen from the authority of Augustine On 83 Diverse Questions q.30: “All perversity, which is named vice, is to use things which are to be enjoyed and to enjoy things which are to be used.” Perversity exists formally in an elicited act of the will, not in delight, since delight is only depraved because the act is depraved, and delight is only in the power of the one delighted because the act is in his power; but sin insofar as it is sin is formally in the power of the sinner. This too Augustine seems manifestly to say On Christian Doctrine I ch.4 n.4: “To enjoy is to inhere by love to some thing for its own sake.” This inhering seems to be through the moving power of the inherer, just as in the case of bodies (from which the name ‘inhere’ is there metaphorically taken) inhesion is by virtue of the inherer.Text cancelled by Scotus: “Likewise ‘inhesion in something for its own sake’ does not seem to be through delight, because the efficient cause of delight seems to be the delightful object and not the end, and thus the one who delights does not seem to tend to the object for its own sake. But this reason does not entail the conclusion - for it proceeds as if the object could not be the efficient and final cause of delight - and it must be solved by holding that delight is of the essence of beatitude, see 4 Suppl. d.49 p.1 q.7 nn.2-7.” ¹⁸

71. But that enjoying is delight alone seems to be said by the authority of Augustine On the Trinity I ch.8 n.18: “Full joy is to enjoy the Trinity;” but if the authority is not twisted toward causality or to some other understanding, which the words do not signify, joy is delight formally. Likewise too in the question alleged already from Augustine: “We enjoy the thing from which we receive pleasure;” if the phrase is meant as identity or as it were a definition, then ‘to receive pleasure’ is to enjoy essentially.

72. But that enjoying may be taken for both things, namely for the act and the delight together, is proved from the definition of ‘to enjoy’ in On the Trinity X ch.10 n.13: “We enjoy the things we know, wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests.” For to the act pertains what is said, that ‘we enjoy the things we know’, because to the act of will the object known is presupposed; but afterwards there is added ‘wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests’ etc., which, if delight were an accident of enjoyment, should not be placed in the definition of it.

Likewise, if it be posited that both the act and the ensuing delight essentially pertain to beatitude [cf. n.70 footnote], then all the authorities that say to enjoy is the highest reward or is our beatitude say that it includes each of them, both the act and the delight. The minor is said by the authority of Augustine in On Christian Doctrine I ch.22 n.35: “Supreme wages are to enjoy him himself.”Text cancelled by Scotus: “But that it be the more proper signification of the word is difficult to prove, yet it can in some way be conjectured from the use of the word: for the word ‘to enjoy’ is construed with the ablative case to signify the object in transitive sense, such as is the construal appropriate to verbs signifying activity, but it is not construed with the object in the ablative case in causal sense, as is the construal due to passions signified by verbs that are primarily passive; for one does not say ‘I am joyed by God’ as one says ‘I am delighted by God’ or ‘God delights me’, but I am said ‘to enjoy God’ transitively in the way I am said ‘to love God’, and that seems to be the more proper signification of the word.” Scotus is here commenting on a peculiarity of Latin grammar, that the phrase ‘I enjoy God’ has a verb in passive form and an object in indirect or causal form (‘fruor Deo’), but in meaning it is active and the object is direct, as in ‘I love God’ (‘amo Deum’). ¹⁹

73. But one should not contend about the signification of the word, because according to Augustine Retractions I ch.15 n.4: “when the thing is clear, one should not force the words.” The thing is clear, because the will has a triple act, and a fourth, to wit the ensuing passion [n.68]; and to two of the acts this name in no way belongs [n.69]; some people seem to use the word for either of the other two and for both together, and then it will be equivocal, - or if it is univocal some of the authorities [nn.70-72] must be expounded as speaking loosely or concomitantly.

II. To the Principal Arguments

74. To the first argument [n.62] I say that fruit is the final thing that is expected from a tree, not as something to be bodily possessed, but as something to be had by the act of the power that attains it as its object; for an apple is not the fruit insofar as it is expected as to be possessed but insofar as it is expected as to be tasted and to be attained by the act of tasting, which tasting is followed by delight; if therefore the fruit is said to be that which is to be enjoyed, delight is not the fruit, but that is which is to be expected last; but delight will not be the enjoying either if the first thing by which I attain the expected thing as expected is to enjoy it, - which seems probable, since fruit is what is expected under the first idea under which, as to be attained by the power, it is expected.

75. To the second [n.63] I say that the authority is to the opposite. For since the authority says that ‘acts are not fruits but passions are’, it follows that to enjoy is not to be delighted, because fruit is the object of enjoyment; but a passion cannot be the object first of itself as it can be the object of an act; therefore to enjoy, if it is of a passion as of its object, as the authority indicates, will not be a passion but an act, able to have for object those passions which are as it were proximate to its first object. - And when it is said that ‘we take joy in fruit per se’, this is not to be understood in the sense of formal principal, in the way ‘it is hot by heat’ is to be understood, but in the sense of object, as if one were to say that ‘we take love in the lovable’; now enjoyment is what, in the sense of formal cause, we enjoy by. But the authority does not say that enjoyment is something consequent to act but that fruit is, that is, the object of enjoyment.

76. The opinion that love and delight are the same is shown by four reasons: first, there is a single act of the same power about the same object; second, the same knowledge is followed immediately only by the same thing; third, things whose opposites are the same are themselves the same as well; fourth, things that have the same effects and the same consequences are the same. - Love and delight differ in idea just as from this to that and the reverse differ; also just as union and rest differ, or the privation of division and the privation of motion.

On the contrary: the definition of love in Rhetoric 2.4.1380b35-81a2 and the definition of delight in Rhetoric 1.11.1369b33-35 are different.

Response:

To the opposite about sadness, in four ways: not to want exists both in God and in the blessed; not to want does not require apprehension of the existence of a thing, or it is about that which neither exists in reality nor is apprehended as existing; not to want is most intense before the coming to be of the thing; I voluntarily do not want.

To the opposite about love: delight is the per se object of love, just as it is of the preceding desire, Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18: “The desire of him who yearns, etc.”

Again, Lucifer is able to love himself supremely, Augustine On the City of God XIV ch. 28 and Anselm On the Fall of the Devil ch.4.

Again, the more intense the love the less the delight [cf. Ethics 3.12.1117b10-11, about the happier and more virtuous man being sadder at death].

Against the first distinction in idea, the agent is different [n.76, end of first paragraph]; against the second, union is a relation. The solution is in Ethics 10.2.1174a4-8.Interpolation (from Appendix A): “Now some say that love and delight are the same really but differ in reason. The first point is proved in four ways. Firstly, because in the case of one power about one object there is one act. The proof is that the distinction of an act is only from the power or the object. - Secondly thus: on something the same there follows immediately only something the same; but, once the object possessed, love and delight immediately follow. - Again: things whose opposites are the same are themselves the same; but hatred and sadness are the same. The fact is plain because each introduces a certain inquietude. - Fourth thus: for they have the same effects and the same consequences. The fact is plain because each has to perfect an operation of the intellect. The second is shown thus, that love is asserted on the basis of what comes from the power to the object, but delight on the basis of the reverse. Also, delight implies rest, which is the privation of motion; but love states union, which is the privation of division. Now these two privations differ only in reason. But to the contrary. Firstly, that the opposites of them are not the same. The proof is that hatred is a certain refusal to will, but refusal to will does not require an existing object, while sadness does. - Secondly, that a very intense refusal to will precedes the event of a thing, but from the event such sadness arises. - Thirdly, because delight is per se the object of enjoyment, but love is not. -Fourthly, because a bad angel can love himself supremely. The thing is plain from Augustine On the City of God XIV ch.28: “Two loves” etc. - Fifthly, because in Ethics 10 [no such reference is found, though there is something close in Eudemian Ethics 7.2.1237b35ff.] it is said that one loves old friends more, but finds more delight in new ones. - Again, the definition of love and that of delight differ. The thing is plain from Rhetoric 2.4.1380b35-81a2. - Again, where sometimes the love is more intense, there the delight is less. The thing is plain in the devoted. To the first of these: the major is false. - To the second: the minor is false. - To the third: it has been shown that the minor is false. - To the fourth I say that they do not perfect in the same way, but delight is as it were an accidental perfection of it, as beauty in youth, from Ethics 10.4.1174b31-33, but love is as it were a commanded act or an act joining the parent with the offspring.” Interpolation: “Note the reasons that the same John [Duns Scotus], in d.1 q.3 in the Parisian Lectura [Rep. IA d.1 p.2 q.2], gives against this conclusion, that enjoyment and love and delight are the same really. The first reason is founded on this that hatred and sadness, which are the opposites of love and delight, are really distinct. His proof for this is that to hate something is not to want it; now not to want and to be sad are not the same thing, because the act of not wanting does not require an object apprehended under the idea of existing, which is what makes one sad, according to Augustine On the City of God XIV ch.6. He also proves the same because it happens that the will changes from not being sad to being said when there is a not wanting equally in place, because a thing intensely not wanted can precede the happening of that not wanted thing itself. Therefore, when the not wanted thing is posited as existing, the not wanting will not be more intense and it is then necessarily sad but before not. Third, because the will freely elicits the act of not wanting as of wanting, but it is not voluntarily saddened; therefore not wanting is not being saddened. A confirmation is that when the will turns itself back on an act voluntarily elicited it has pleasure in itself, and so a will willing itself freely not to want has pleasure in itself; but a will that turns itself back on being sad does not have pleasure in itself but is displeased; therefore etc The second reason: in God there is properly found the act of not wanting, but not the act of being sad. The assumption is plain, because just as God is by his willing the cause of things that come to be, so by his not willing he is a cause preventative of bad things. The third reason: delight can be the per se object of some love of which love cannot be the per se object. The proof of this is that the will can choose to be delighted in the delightful thing itself when that delightful thing is absent, and of that choice delight is the per se object, but choice or love is not, because then the will would be turning itself back on its own act; but it is not necessary that the will turn itself back on its own act when it desires to be conjoined to its delightful object, or when it desires to be delighted in the delightful object when it will have become present; therefore when by an act of love it chooses the delightful thing or chooses to be delighted, it is not necessary that it be turned back, therefore delight can be the object of a love of which it is not the love. Again, a bad angel can love itself supremely, and yet does not have delight. The thing is plain in Augustine On the City of God ibid. ch.28. Again, a more intense love is compatible with a less intense delight, as in the case of the devoted/infatuated. ²⁰